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Quantum steganography is the study of hiding secret quantum information by encoding it into
what an eavesdropper would perceive as an innocent-looking message. Here we study an explicit
steganographic encoding for Alice to hide her secret message in the syndromes of an error-correcting
code, so that the encoding simulates a given noisy quantum channel. We calculate achievable rates
of steganographic communication over noiseless quantum channels using this encoding. We give
definitions of secrecy and reliability for the communication process, and with these assumptions
derive upper bounds on the amount of steganographic communication possible, and show that these
bounds match the communication rates achieved with our encoding. This gives a steganographic
capacity for a noiseless channel emulating a given noisy channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of steganography is perhaps best moti-
vated by considering an example. Suppose two political
protestors Alice and Bob are arrested and put into two
widely separated jail cells. The warden allows them to
communicate with hand-written letters that he reads be-
fore delivering. However, if the warden reads anything
in the letters that he finds suspicious (such as a possible
escape plan), then he will not deliver the letter. Luckily,
Alice and Bob exchanged a secret key before their incar-
ceration. Can Alice and Bob communicate their escape
plan to each other without arousing the warden’s suspi-
cions? This is where the study of steganography comes
into play.
The science of sending information through seemingly
innocuous messages has a long history, dating back to at
least 440 B.C.[1]. It is worth making clear its differences
from cryptography. In cryptography, a secret message
(the plaintext) is encrypted using the shared secret key,
and the resulting ciphertext is then sent to the desired re-
ceiver to be decoded. If an eavesdropper (Eve) observes
the ciphertext, she cannot decode it without the secret
key. However, she will know that there is a secret mes-
sage, since Alice is sending apparent gibberish to Bob.
By contrast, if Alice uses a steganographic encoding,
she hides the secret message (or stegotext) into a larger
covertext, which appears to Eve as an innocuous message.
The hidden message may or may not be encrypted itself,
but the main line of defense is that the eavesdropper is
unaware that a message is even being sent.
During WWII, a Japanese spy named Velvalee Dickin-
son sent classified information to neutral South America.
She was a dealer in dolls, and her letters discussed the
quantity and type of doll to ship. The covertext was the
doll orders, while the concealed stegotext was encoded
information about battleship movements [2].
The quantum analogue of cryptography has been
widely studied [3]. However, the quantum analogue of
steganography is still in a relatively early stage. There
have been a number of different proposals for encod-
ing quantum information steganographically, or encod-
ing classical information into quantum states or channels
[4, 5]. In this paper we consider hiding secret messages as
error syndromes of a quantum error-correcting code [6].
This approach to quantum steganography has been stud-
ied in detail by Shaw and Brun, with explicit encoding
and decoding procedures and calculated rates of commu-
nication and secret key consumption [7, 8]. It was shown
that such schemes can hide both quantum and classical
information, with a quantitative measure of secrecy, even
in the presence of a noisy physical channel. When the
error rate of the physical channel is lower than the eaves-
dropper’s expectation, it is possible to achieve non-zero
asymptotic rates of communication. (If the eavesdropper
has exact knowledge of the channel, secret communica-
tion may still be possible, but the amount of secret in-
formation that can be transmitted in general grows sub-
linearly with the number of channel uses.)
More recently, a closely related idea has been stud-
ied under the name of quantum covert communication
[9–13]. Many of the ideas in this paper are closely re-
lated to steganographic requirements, such as secrecy
and recoverability. This is not surprising, since covert
quantum communication can be seen as a special case of
quantum steganography over noisy quantum channels in
the case when the eavesdropper has exact knowledge of
the channel, and where Eve assumes the channel is idle
(so only noise is being transmitted). Similarly, quantum
steganography is a type of covert quantum communica-
tion where Eve knows about the covertext communica-
tion but not the hidden stegotext, and where Eve may
not have perfect knowledge of the channel. The work on
covert communication has generally found that, if Eve
has exact knowledge of the channel, the amount of secret
communication that can be done grows like the square
root of the number of channel used.
The goal of this paper is to formalize the assumptions
and reasonable conditions of quantum steganography in-
troduced in [7], and to give upper bounds on the achiev-
able rates of quantum communication while remaining
secure from an eavesdropper’s suspicion, for the special
case when the true underlying channel is noiseless. Our
results include achievability results as well as converse
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2proofs for quantum steganography.
In Section II we formalize our notion of quantum
steganography where secret messages are hidden in the
syndromes of an error-correcting code, and outline a spe-
cific steganographic encoding where Alice is able to em-
ulate any general quantum channel N on her encoded
secret message and covertext. We work out specific ex-
amples for the bit-flip channel and the depolarizing chan-
nel, before giving the more general result. In Section III
we prove upper bounds on the amount of steganographic
communication possible, and show that these bounds are
asymptotically equal to the rates achieved in the previous
section.
The assumption that the physical channel is noiseless
greatly simplifies the analysis. However, we believe that
the main intuition underlying this approach will apply
equally well in the case of a noisy channel. We will end
this paper with a discussion of how to extend this work
to the case where the physical channel between the two
parties is noisy.
II. QUANTUM STEGANOGRAPHY:
ACHIEVABILITY
As discussed in the introduction, there have been sev-
eral approaches to generalizing steganography to the
quantum setting. Here we will make explicit the notion of
quantum steganography based on syndromes of quantum
error-correcting codes. We assume that Eve expects to
see quantum information passing through a noisy quan-
tum channel. However, the actual physical channel is
assumed to be noiseless. This is obviously an idealized
assumption, which greatly simplifies the analysis; we will
discuss below how it might be justified at least as an
approximation.
Alice wants send a secret message steganographically
to Bob. Using her shared secret key, she encodes the
stego text into a codeword of a quantum error-correcting
code (QECC) with errors applied to it, and sends it to
Bob. The codeword encodes an innocent state; the stego
text is conveyed in the errors. If Eve were to perform
measurements on this codeword, it would be indistin-
guishable from an innocent encoded covertext that had
passed through a given noisy quantum channel to Bob.
Before discussing how to quantify the security of a
quantum steganographic protocol, let us make clear what
Alice is trying to achieve. Alice wants to encode an in-
nocent covertext state, together with her secret message,
into an N -qubit codeword in such a way that it cannot
be distinguished from the covertext alone encoded into a
quantum error-correcting code that has undergone typi-
cal errors induced by the quantum channel N⊗N . The
steganographic encoding works by mapping all possible
secret messages onto syndromes of the QECC. This en-
coding is not limited to classical messages: it is possible
to encode a quantum state by preparing the codeword in
a superposition of different error syndromes.
In analyzing this quantum steganography protocol, we
make the following assumptions. Alice is communicating
with Bob by a quantum channel that is actually noise-
less. But the eavesdropper, Eve, believes that this chan-
nel is noisy, perhaps because Alice and Bob have been
systematically making the channel appear noisier than it
actually is. Because Alice and Bob have been system-
atically deceiving Eve in this way, we assume that they
know (at least fairly closely) what Eve’s estimate of the
channel is. Before the protocol began, Alice and Bob
shared with each other a secret key: an arbitrarily long
string of random bits. This key is known only to the
two of them. But once the protocol begins, they can-
not communicate except through channels that can be
monitored by Eve. Alice sends an innocent-looking mes-
sage to Bob over the channel. This is a covertext state
ρc, encoded into an error-correcting code; it is assumed
that the choice of code is known to Eve, and this code
should be a plausible choice for the noisy channel that
Eve believes exists.
One important caveat for this section: we will be con-
sidering the case where the QECC that Alice uses is non-
degenerate. That is, each typical error corresponds to a
unique error syndrome. This allows Alice to communi-
cate as much steganographic information as possible, and
it allows us to ignore the details of which QECC is be-
ing used. Methods similar to those in this section should
also work for degenerate codes; but in that case, the en-
coding will be strongly dependent on the properties of
the particular code, since the typical errors must first
be grouped into equivalent sets, and then the possible
messages mapped into these sets. We also use this as-
sumption in the next section to get specific expressions
for the upper bound on the secret communication rate.
To clarify how the encoding works, we start by consid-
ering two examples for relatively simple channels: first,
the case where Alice is emulating a bit flip channel NBFp
on the codeword, and second, the case where she is em-
ulating the depolarizing channel. Finally we consider a
more general error map N⊗N . The message qubits are
encoded into into the error syndromes of the codeword
of the QECC she is using.
A. The Bit Flip Channel
Suppose that Eve believes the channel connecting Alice
and Bob to be a bit flip channel, with a probability p
of error per qubit sent. (The actual physical channel is
noiseless, as assumed above.) Alice sends a codeword of
length N to Bob, encoding some “innocent” covertext
state ρc. The errors in the codewords that Alice sends to
Bob should be binomially distributed: pN is the mean
number of errors of this distribution, and the variance is
(1−p)pN . The total probability that there is an error of
weight w on the codeword should be
pk =
(
N
w
)
pw(1− p)N−w. (1)
3There are (
N
w
)
≡ N !
w!(N − w)!
such errors, all with equal probability pw(1− p)N−w.
If N is large, then it is extremely likely that the num-
ber of bit flips will be a typical error—that is, an er-
ror of weight w within a narrow range about the mean
pN . Alice’s encoding will make use of these typical er-
rors. For each w from Np(1 − δ) to Np(1 + δ), where√
(1− p)/pN  δ  1, Alice chooses at random a set of
Cw possible error strings of weight w. (An error string of
weight w is a string of N bits, with a 1 at every location
with a bit flip and 0 at every location with no error.)
This random choice is made using the shared secret key
with Bob, so that Bob also knows which set of errors is
being used to encode secret messages, but Eve (who does
not share the key) could not know this.
Let these sets of error strings of weight w be called
{Sw}, and the set of all strings used in the encoding is
S =
⋃
w
Sw. (2)
We sum up
C =
Np(1+δ)∑
w=Np(1−δ)
Cw = |S|. (3)
So the total number of strings in the set S is C. This
number C is the total number of possible distinct secret
messages that Alice can send to Bob (though she may
also send superpositions of these messages). We assume
all these messages to be equally likely. So the message
encodes M = log2 C bits (or qubits) of information.
Define the probability q = 1/C. These error strings S
are typical strings (using the definition of weak typicality
from information theory). Eve should not be suspicious
at seeing such an error string, since it matches a probable
result for the channel that she expects. For this encod-
ing to be indistinguishable from the bit flip channel, the
probability of the message being an error string of weight
w should equal the value from the distribution in Eq. (1)
above. This means we want to satisfy
qCw =
Cw
C
= pw. (4)
Clearly we must have
Cw ≤
(
N
w
)
,
for all w in the typical range. This implies that:
Cwp
w(1− p)N−w ≤
(
N
w
)
pw(1− p)N−w = Cwq,
⇒ pw(1− p)N−w ≤ q. (5)
To communicate the maximum amount of information
steganographically we want C to be as large as possible,
which means we want q to be as small as possible. The
constraint in Eq. (5) then gives us
q = pNp(1−δ)(1− p)N(1−p+pδ). (6)
So Alice can send M stego qubits to Bob, where
M = log2 C = log2 1/q
=N(−p log2 p− (1− p) log2(1− p)
+ δ(p log2 p− p log2(1− p)))
=N(h(p)− δp log2((1− p)/p))
≈Nh(p), (7)
where h(p) = −p log2 p−(1−p) log2(1−p) is the entropy
of the bit flip channel on one qubit. Therefore, with this
encoding Alice can send almost Nh(p) bits.
In [7] it is shown that the diamond norm distance be-
tween the channel (NBFp )⊗N and Alice’s encoding is ex-
ponentially small in N . This justifies the claim that this
protocol will not arouse suspicion from Eve. In section III
we use a slightly modified definition of secrecy that allows
us to prove the converse bound on this rate of stego com-
munication by information theoretic techniques. That
means that this encoding is essentially optimal: the max-
imum rate of steganographic communication for a non-
degenerate code in the case of the bit flip channel is h(p).
B. Depolarizing Channel
Here we will consider the scenario where the channel
Alice is emulating is the depolarizing channel. It turns
out that due to the symmetric nature of the depolarizing
channel the encoding looks quite similar to that of the bit
flip channel. Recall that the depolarizing channel acting
on a single qubit ρ is given by
NDCp (ρ) = (1− p)ρ+ (p/3)(XρX + Y ρY + ZρZ).
Applying this channel on N qubits, the total probability
of all errors with exactly n1 X, n2 Y , and n3 Z errors
(and n4 = N − n1 − n2 − n3 identity “errors”) is
p(n1, n2, n3, n4) =
N !
n1!n2!n3!n4!
(p/3)n1+n2+n3(1− p)n4 .
Notice that instead of specifying n1, n2, and n3 exactly,
we can instead talk about errors with weight w = n1 +
n2 + n3. It follows by simple calculation that the total
probability of all errors of weight w is
p(w) = 3w
(
N
w
)
(p/3)w(1−p)N−w =
(
N
w
)
pw(1−p)N−w,
which is just a binomial distribution in w. As in the
bit flip case, we will need say what strings of errors are
typical. There are a number of ways we could specify
4this, but for simplicity we will consider weights w that
lie between Np(1−δ) and Np(1+δ) for √(1− p)/pN 
δ  1. The astute reader will notice that this set includes
some errors that are not typical: for instance, it includes
errors of weight w where all (or most) of the errors are
X’s and none (or few) are Y ’s or Z’s. If such errors
are used as codewords, they might make Eve suspicious.
Still, the effect of this is not too large, because this set
is still dominated by typical errors, and the probabilities
of these strings are similar to the expected probabilities
of atypical errors. With this definition of typicality, we
can follow the exact same encoding given for the bit flip
code using errors with weight w, except that the set of
errors of weight w is now of size(
N
w
)
3w,
and errors of weight w have probability (p/3)w(1−p)N−w.
This then leads to the following encoding rate:
M = N(−p log2(p/3)− (1− p) log2(1− p)
+ δ(p log2(p/3)− p log2(1− p)))
= N(s(p) + δ(p log2(p/3)− p log2(1− p))
≈ Ns(p) (8)
where we have defined s(p) = −p log2(p/3) − (1 −
p) log2(1− p) to be the entropy of the depolarizing chan-
nel on one qubit.
C. General Channels
1. Special case: random unitaries
Consider a quantum channel acting on a single qubit
of the form
N (ρ) =
k∑
i=1
piUiρU
†
i , (9)
where the operators Ui are all unitary, so UiU
†
i = U
†
i Ui =
I. The set of Kraus operators {√piUi} can be thought
of as a set of possible single-qubit unitary errors Ui that
occur with probability pi. Note that both the bit-flip
and depolarizing channels are special cases of the random
unitary channel, as is any Pauli channel. The channel
acts on an N -qubit encoded state ρ as N⊗N (ρ).
The total probability of all errors with n1 U1 errors,
n2 U2 errors, and so forth, is given by the multinomial
distribution:
p(n1, . . . , nk) =
N !
n1! · · ·nk!p
n1
1 · · · pnkk . (10)
Now consider weights nj in the range from Npj(1− δ) to
Npj(1+δ), where δ is large enough that this set includes
all the typical strings. (This definition can be modified,
but for simplicity we stick with it in this paper.) Ran-
domly choose Cn1,...,nk strings with weights n1, n2, . . . , nk
in this range such that n1 + . . . + nk = N . As with the
bit flip and depolarizing channels, let these sets of strings
be called Sn1,...,nk and let S denote the union of all these
sets of strings, which are a subset of the typical strings.
For all weights n1, . . . , nk outside the typical set, we let
Cn1,...,nk = 0. The total number of strings in the set S
is C:
C =
∑
n1,...,nk
Cn1,...,nk . (11)
Defining q ≡ 1/C, we want to satisfy
Cn1,...,nkq = Cn1,...,nk/C = p(n1, . . . , nk) (12)
for all weights n1, . . . , nk in the typical set, so that Eve
does not become suspicious. Also, clearly Cn1,...,nk must
be less than N !n1!···nk! . This implies that:
Cn1,...,nkp
n1
1 · · · pnkk ≤
N !
n1! · · ·nk!p
n1
1 · · · pnkk
Cn1,...,nkp
n1
1 · · · pnkk ≤ Cn1,...,nkq
pn11 · · · pnkk ≤ q. (13)
Notice that this time we cannot simply plug in the lower
bounds of the sums for nj , as we did for the depolarizing
and bit flip channels, because we have the additional con-
straint that n1+. . .+nk = N . However, the same general
argument applies. Inside the set of typical weights, there
is a string n˜1, · · · , n˜k with |n˜j/N − pj | ≤ δpj for all j,
that maximizes the probability:
pmax ≡ pn˜11 pn˜22 · · · pn˜kk . (14)
We can choose q = pmax, and use this to put a bound on
the number of stego qubits M Alice can send to Bob:
M = log2 C = − log2(q) = − log2 pmax
= −n˜1 log2(p1)− . . .− n˜k log2(pk)
= N(− n˜1
N
log2(p1)− . . .−
n˜k
N
log2(pk))
≥ N(1− δ)(−
k∑
i=1
pi log2(pi))
= N(1− δ)H(p1, . . . , pk). (15)
So in the limit of large N , we should approach a rate
H(p1, . . . , pk) with this encoding.
2. Encoding general channels across multiple code blocks
This argument does not necessarily apply directly to
a general quantum channel, since the probabilities of the
different outcomes can be state dependent. However, we
should be able to do a similar type of encoding for a
5general quantum channel N by encoding across multiple
code blocks. Consider a general quantum channel acting
on a single qubit as
N (ρ) =
k∑
i=1
AiρA
†
i . (16)
The channel acts on an N -qubit encoded state ρ as
N⊗N (ρ), where we will let N become large. For most
states ρ, we can well approximate this N -qubit channel
by a sum over the typical errors [14, 15],
N⊗N (ρ) ≈
∑
i∈T
EiρE
†
i , (17)
where ρ is now the N -qubit codeword, the index is i =
i1i2 . . . iN , the typical error Ei is
Ei = Ai1 ⊗Ai2 ⊗ · · · ⊗AiN , (18)
and T is the set of typical sequences i [16].
We assume that the QECC Alice uses is one that can
correct the typical errors of the channel. (Indeed, using
a code that was not strong enough to correct the typical
errors might well arouse Eve’s suspicions.) We will also
assume, for simplicity of this analysis, that the QECC is
nondegenerate. This means that on a valid codeword in
the QECC, the typical errors Ei all have distinct error
syndromes, and act as unitaries that move the state to
a distinct, orthogonal subspace labeled by i. This means
that error Ei occurs with a fixed probability pi for all
valid codewords of the QECC.
We can then essentially repeat the argument that leads
to Eq. (15), but now using the probabilities pi. Note that
we now need to take two limits: the limit of many blocks,
and also the limit where the individual blocks are large.
For this argument to apply, we need to first go to the
limit of many blocks, and then to the limit of large block
size. In those limits, we can approach a rate
− 1
N
∑
i
pi log2 pi ≡ H¯, (19)
where H¯ is an effective entropy per qubit from the chan-
nel.
Note that there are some ambiguities in making this
argument. The Kraus map in Eq. (16) is not unique.
Choosing different sets of Kraus operators will lead to
different sets of typical errors. However, these differences
should not lead to significant changes to the effective en-
tropy in the limit of large block size, so long as the code
is nondegenerate on both sets of typical errors.
D. Secret key consumption
For the above encodings, how much secret key must be
consumed? In general, we can assume that all the details
of the encoding, etc., have been decided between Alice
and Bob ahead of time. So in the protocol as described
above, the only place where secret key is consumed is to
pick the subsets of errors used in the encoding.
Let’s consider the bit flip channel as a simple ex-
ample. The possible messages are mapped onto a set
of C error syndromes, representing errors of weights
(1 − δ)Np ≤ w ≤ (1 + δ)Np. For each error weight
w in that range, a subset of Cw errors is chosen to repre-
sent possible messages. Alice and Bob can agree before
the protocol begins to divide the set of errors of weight w
into nw nonoverlapping subsets of Cw errors each, where
nw =
(
N
w
)
/Cw =
(
1− p
p
)w−Np(1−δ)
. (20)
(Since this is unlikely to be an exact integer, one must
generally round down, which means that a small frac-
tion of possible errors will be omitted. This will slightly
reduce the match between the steganographic encoding
and the noisy channel being simulated, but for large N
and p 1 the difference will be small.)
For each transmitted block, Alice and Bob must ran-
domly choose one of these nw subsets for each weight w
in the typical range. Choosing a subset requires log2 nw
random bits, which are drawn from their shared key.
However, since any given message is encoded as an er-
ror of some specific weight w, Alice and Bob can reuse
the same secret key bits to choose the subset for each
error weight w. So the number of key bits consumed
to transmit one block is equal to the maximum value of
log2 nw for (1− δ)Np ≤ w ≤ (1 + δ)Np, which is
K = max
Np(1−δ)≤w≤Np(1+δ)
log2 nw
= max
Np(1−δ)≤w≤Np(1+δ)
log2
(
1− p
p
)w−Np(1−δ)
= (2Npδ) log2
(
1− p
p
)
. (21)
How does this scale with N? Since this is a binomial
distribution, δ will take the form
δ = D
√
1
N
(
1− p
p
)
, (22)
where D is a fixed constant determining what fraction
of all errors are included in the typical set. The key
consumption therefore is
K = 2D
√
N
(
1− p
p
)
log2
(
1− p
p
)
. (23)
The key consumption scales sublinearly with N , and
asymptotically the key consumption rate goes to zero.
While the details will vary, we expect this kind of sub-
linear scaling of K with N to be generic.
A few words more on secret key consumption are in
order. In [7], Shaw and Brun make a distinction between
6the secrecy and the security of a steganographic proto-
col. A steganographic protocol is secret if an eavesdrop-
per without the secret key cannot distinguish between an
encoded message being sent and the noisy channel being
applied. It is secure if the eavesdropper cannot learn
anything about the message, even if she knows that a
message is begin sent.
Using a sublinear amount K of shared secret key is
sufficient to make the steganographic protocol secret, by
this definition. However, it is not secure, in general. Since
the number of qubits M transmitted is typically larger
than the number of secret key bitsK consumed, we would
generically expect an eavesdropper to be able to learn on
the order of M−K bits of information about the message
if she became aware of its existence.
This can be prevented by first encrypting the message
before doing the steganographic encoding. Encryption
requires M bits of secret key in the case of a classical
message (using a one-time pad), or 2M bits of secret key
in the case of a quantum message (by twirling). In this
case, the protocol is both secret and secure. However,
there is a cost: the secret key is now consumed asymp-
totically at a linear rate.
III. SECRECY, RELIABILITY, AND BOUNDS
A. The information processing task
Here we consider the steganographic scenario as out-
lined above where Alice is using fake noise to hide her
message from Eve, but the actual physical channel she
is sending her information over is noiseless. We will con-
sider the task known as entanglement transmission. This
notion of quantum communication encompasses other
quantum information-processing tasks such as mixed-
state transmission, pure-state transmission, and entan-
glement generation. We follow closely the discussion of
quantum communication in [16].
The information processing task we are considering
is visualized in Figure 1. Alice has a secret message
of M = log2 |A1| qubits, which is maximally entangled
with a reference system R. She also prepares an inno-
cent covertext ρc which will be encoded into the N -qubit
quantum error-correcting code. Let us first define her
encoded state, dependent on the secret key element k:
ωk,A′nR ≡ Ek,A1C→A′n(ρc ⊗ ΦA1R). (24)
This dependence of the encoding on the secret key cor-
responds to choosing among the different sets of error
strings S in the protocols from the previous section. To
someone (like Eve) who does not know the secret key k,
the state is effectively
ωA′nR ≡
∑
k
pkωk,A′nR, (25)
where ωA′nR is the state averaged over all possible values
of the secret key k with probabilities pk. (We can choose
FIG. 1. The information processing task we consider for Al-
ice sending M stego qubits to Bob over a quantum channel
(which is identity for the noiseless case). Alice encodes her
message M and an innocent covertext ρc into a suitable quan-
tum error-correcting code which has had typical errors applied
to it, where the encoding depends on the secret key k. She
sends this to Bob, who then decodes the message and cover-
text using his copy of the shared secret key k. Alice’s message
is entangled with a reference system R. The ability to trans-
mit entanglement implies the ability to do general quantum
communication.
this probability to be uniform for simplicity, pk = p for
all k, if we so desire.)
What is a good way to guarantee secrecy from Eve?
We propose the following secrecy condition:
1
2
‖TrR(ωA′nR)−N⊗N (V ρcV †)‖1 ≤ δ (26)
where N is whatever channel Alice is emulating, V is
an isometry representing the encoding of the covertext
into a suitably chosen codeword (one which can correct
typical errors induced by the channel N ) and δ > 0 is
some small parameter. What this condition says is that
if Eve observes the quantum state, it will be effectively
indistinguishable from an encoded covertext being sent
through the noisy quantum channel N .
We introduce another requirement which corresponds
to a notion of recoverability. Once Bob receives the state,
he applies his decoder Dk,A′n→B1C to obtain the original
ρc ⊗ ΦB1R. We can relax this by only requiring that the
input states and output states are  close, that is:
1
2
‖Dk,A′n→B1C(ωk,A′nR)− ρc ⊗ ΦB1R‖1 ≤ ,∀k (27)
where  > 0 is a small parameter.
B. Upper bound on steganographic rate
With these two assumptions of secrecy and recover-
ability, we can now put a bound on the number of qubits
7M that can be sent reliably and stegonagraphically from
Alice to Bob. Defining σE ≡ N⊗N (V ρcV †) and applying
the Fannes-Audeneart inequality to the secrecy condition
we have:
H(TrR(ωA′nR)) ≤ H(σE) + δN + h2(δ) (28)
where h2 is the binary entropy function. Furthermore,
from the recoverability condition we have
M = log |A1| = I(R〉B1)Φ
≤ I(R〉B1)Dk(ω) + N + (1 + )h2(/[1 + ])
≤ I(R〉A′n)ωk + f(N, )
≤ H(TrR(ωk,A′nR)) + f(N, ). (29)
The first equality follows from the fact that the coherent
information of a maximally entangled state is just the
logarithm of the dimension of one of the subsystems. The
first inequality follows from the AFW inequality applied
to (27). The second inequality is the data processing
inequality. The last inequality follows from the definition
of the coherent information.
The concavity of entropy implies that∑
k
pkH(ωk,A′n) ≤ H
(∑
k
pkωk,A′n
)
= H(ωA′n). (30)
The encodings Ek,A1C→A′n are isometries, which means
that H(ωk,A′n) has the same value for every k. We can
therefore sum over the probabilities pk on the left-hand
side of (30) to get
H(TrR(ωk,A′nR)) ≤ H(TrR(ωA′nR)). (31)
Now putting (28) and (29) together we arrive at our
main result, which states that Alice can secretly and re-
liably send M stego qubits to Bob, where M is bounded
above by
M ≤ H(TrR(ωRA′n)) + f(N, )
≤ H(σE) + g(N, δ) + f(N, ), (32)
where g(N, δ) ≡ δN + h2(δ). Thus, if we can compute
a maximum for H(N⊗N (ρ)) when ρ is pure (because V
is an isometric encoding and ρc is pure), we have a tight
upper bound on the number of qubits M that can be sent
steganographically over a noiseless quantum channel. (Of
course, if the actual quantum channel is noisy, then this
bound will in general be changed. This is the topic of
future work.)
C. Upper bounds for specific channels
We will now apply our result (32) to the channels dis-
cussed in the previous section, where we make the im-
plicit assumption that Alice is using a nondegenerate
code. Though our result (32) is true in general, for a
degenerate code the number of distinct error syndromes
is smaller (depending on the code), and the bounds dis-
cussed here and achievable rates discussed in the previous
section would be adjusted.
1. The bit flip channel
For the bit flip channel, i.e., NBF (ρ) = (1 − p)ρ +
pXρX, the maximum of H(N⊗N (ρ)) over all N -qubit
pure states ρ is Nh(p) where h(p) = −p log p − (1 −
p) log(1− p) is the entropy of a single qubit sent through
a bit flip channel. To prove this, consider some pure state
ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|. Then
N⊗NBF (|ψ〉〈ψ|) =
∑
s
p(s)Xs|ψ〉〈ψ|Xs (33)
where we are summing over all binary strings s of length
N ; Xs is the operator acting on N qubits with an X
acting at every location where s has a 1 and an I where
s has a 0. The probability p(s) is given by
p(s) = pw(s)(1− p)(N−w(s)), (34)
where w(s) is the weight of string s. The Shannon en-
tropy of this distribution is Nh(p), since it is a binomial
distribution. The von Neumann entropy is the minimum
Shannon entropy over all possible ensemble decomposi-
tions of the given state, and it is not hard to check that it
is achieved when |ψ〉 is a Z eigenstate. Thus the encod-
ing described in the previous section for steganography
with an simulated bit flip channel is essentially optimal.
2. More general channels
Unfortunately, for a more general quantum channel N
we may not know, in general, what N -qubit pure state
ρ maximizes H(N⊗N (ρ)). However, we can still bound
this quantity. First, consider a general quantum channel
N that acts on an N qubit pure state as follows:
N⊗N (ρ) ≈
∑
j
EjρE
†
j (35)
where {Ej} is the set of typical errors associated with N
applications of the channel N . Recall that we are choos-
ing our isometric encoding to correct for typical errors of
whatever channel N it is we are emulating. Though the
set of correctable errors {Ej} need not act like unitaries
on the codespace, we can always find a set of correctable
errors {E˜j}j that do [17]. To see this, first consider the
Knill-Laflamme condition:
PE†iEjP = αijP (36)
where P is the codespace projector and α is a Hermitian
matrix. Thus, we can write α˜ = U†αU where U is a
unitary matrix and α˜ is diagonal.
E˜k =
∑
j
MjkEk (37)
8where the unitary M is chosen in such a way as to diag-
onalize α. That is
PE˜†kE˜lP =
∑
ij
M∗ikMjlPE
†
iEjP
= (
∑
ij
M∗ikαijMjl)P
= α˜klP = δklα˜kkP. (38)
Note that these errors {E˜j} act unitarily on the
codespace. So long as the Knill-Laflamme condition is
satisfied, we can always diagonalize α in this way. Now
going back to our expression for the channel action,∑
j
EjρE
†
j =
∑
k,l,j
MkjM
∗
ljE˜kρE˜
†
l =
∑
k
E˜kρE˜
†
k. (39)
Because we have assumed that the typical errors are
all correctable, and that the code is nondegenerate,
the states E˜kρE˜
†
k are all orthogonal to each other, and
Tr{E˜kρE˜†k} = αkk. The von Neumann entropy is the
Shannon entropy minimized over all possible decomposi-
tions, so the entropy of this state is clearly
H(σE) = H(N⊗N (V ρcV †)) ≤ −
∑
k
αkk log2(αkk).
(40)
By (32) we have shown that the amount of stegano-
graphic communication allowed for a quantum channel
N emulation is upper bounded by this quantity. Apply-
ing this to the general channel discussed in section II.C
above, we see that this quantity is equal to NH¯, where
H¯ is the effective entropy per qubit defined in Eq. (19).
So this encoding approaches the maximum possible rate
for the general channel, just as for the bit flip channel.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Quantum steganography is the study of secret quan-
tum communication between two parties, Alice and Bob.
We have shown that Alice and Bob are able to commu-
nicate with each other secretly at a nonzero rate using
a shared secret key, without arousing suspicion from a
potential eavesdropper Eve. In this paper we gave ex-
plicit bounds on the number of stego qubits that Alice
can send to Bob when Alice is simulating a general quan-
tum channel N with her stego encoded message, as well
as explicit encodings to that achieve these bounds, for
the case when the actual physical channel is noiseless.
The obvious next question is what if the channel shared
between Alice and Bob (as is generally the case) is noisy?
There is reason to believe that so long as Eve has some
ignorance about the actual physical channel, then Alice
will still be able to communicate steganographically to
Bob.
For instance, suppose the actual physical channel is a
depolarizing channel Np where p is the depolarizing pa-
rameter and the channel that Eve expects is Np+−4p/3
for some small suitably chosen  > 0. Then Alice can
emulate a depolarizing channel N in such a way such
that if Eve observes the state Alice is sending to Bob,
it will look like an innocent encoded covertext passing
through N applications of a channel Np ◦N (where N is
the length of the codeword Alice is using). There should
be elements of the encoding given in this paper that will
generalize to the noisy case for general channels N . This
will certainly be an area of fruitful future study.
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